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State v. Goodwin: DEFINING SERIOUS BODILY
INJURY IN AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND
KIDNAPPING CASES
Janet L. Freeman
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Montana Criminal Code, the severity of punish-
ment for aggravated kidnapping' and assault 2 depends upon the
degree of bodily harm threatened or inflicted by the perpetrator of
the criminal act. The question becomes whether the bodily harm
suffered by the victim was a "serious bodily injury" or a mere
1. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-303 (1985) states:
(1) A person commits the offense of aggravated kidnapping if he knowingly or
purposely and without lawful authority restrains another person ... by using or
threatening to use physical force with any of the following purposes:
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another;
(2) . . . a person convicted of the offense of aggravated kidnapping shall be
punished by death or life imprisonment . . . or be imprisoned in the state prison
for a term of not less than 2 years or more than 100 years . . . unless he has
voluntarily released the victim alive, in a safe place, and not suffering from serious
bodily injury, in which event he shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a term
of not less than 2 years or more than 10 years .
2. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-201 (1985) states:
(1) A person commits the offense of assault if he:
(a) purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another;
(b) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a weapon;
(c) purposely or knowingly makes physical contact of an insulting or provok-
ing nature with any individual; or
(d) purposely or knowingly causes reasonable apprehension of bodily injury in
another ....
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), a person convicted of assault shall
* . . be imprisoned in the county jail for any term not to exceed 6 months . ...
(3) If the victim is less than 14 years old and the offender is 18 or more years
old, the offender, upon conviction under subsection (1)(a), shall be . . . impris-
oned in the state prison for a term not to exceed 5 years ..
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-202 (1985) states:
(1) A person commits the offense of aggravated assault if he purposely or
knowingly causes serious bodily injury to another.
(2) A person commits the offense of felony assault if he purposely or know-
ingly causes:
(a) bodily injury to another with a weapon;
(b) reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury in another by use of a
weapon; or
(c) bodily injury to a peace officer ..
(3) A person convicted of aggravated assault shall be imprisoned in the state
prison for a term of not less than 2 years or more than 20 years . . .. A person
convicted of felony assault shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a term not
to exceed 10 years . . ..
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"bodily injury." The Montana Criminal Code, enacted in 1973,' de-
fines both terms:
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a
substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent dis-
figurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function or
process of any bodily member or organ. It includes serious mental
illness or impairment.4
"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impair-
ment of physical condition and includes mental illness or
impairment. 5
A "bodily injury" inflicted without the use of a weapon carries
a maximum term of six months in the county jail. A conviction
involving "serious bodily injury," however, imposes a substantially
greater sentence. Problems may arise when interpreting these two
definitions, because medical treatment can, and frequently does,
prevent a potential serious bodily injury from meeting the statu-
tory requirements. The Montana Supreme Court faced this di-
lemma in State v. Goodwin8 and held that if serious bodily harm
would have resulted in the absence of medical intervention, then
the injury would meet the statutory requirements of serious bodily
injury. This case note examines the shortcomings of the statutory
definitions of serious bodily injury and bodily injury in light of
Goodwin, and proposes a legislative amendment to address the
questions raised by medical treatment immediately following the
physical attack.
II. PRIOR STANDARD: GRIEVOUS BODILY HARM
Prior to 1973, a felony assault offense required a "grievous
bodily harm" as the requisite standard of injury.9 The earlier crim-
inal code lacked a statutory definition of "grievous bodily harm,"
yet the courts placed much emphasis on this term in distinguishing
a felony assault 0 from a simple assault." The vintage Montana
3. 1973 Mont. Laws ch. 513, § 1 (MONTANA CRIMINAL CODE OF 1973, tit. 94, MONT. REV.
CODES 1947, effective January 1, 1974) (codified as amended at MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 45
(1985)).
4. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(59) (1985).
5. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(5) (1985).
6. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-201(2) (1985).
7. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-201(3) (five years), -202(3) (ten years), -202(3) (twenty
years), -303(2) (one hundred years, life imprisonment, or death) (1985).
8. - Mont. -, 679 P.2d 231 (1984).
9. MONT. REV. CODES § 94-602(3), (4) (Supp. 1977).
10. MONT. REV. CODES 8 94-602 (1947).
11. MONT. REV. CODES 8 94-603 (1947).
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case of State v. Laughlin12 provides an understanding of this tradi-
tional distinction.' s The Laughlin court ruled that an injury could
be described as "grievous" merely by contrasting the injury to one
that was "slight or moderate.""' Thus, the judicial definition of
"grievous bodily harm" as mandated by the court in 1937 included
"any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with [the] health or
comfort of the person injured."'8 Further, Laughlin held that the
injury need not be of a "permanent character"' 6 and that the word
"grievous" meant "atrocious, aggravated, harmful, painful, hard to
bear and serious in nature.'
' 7
The 1973 Legislature completely revised Montana's criminal
code, substituting "grievous bodily harm" with a dual standard:
mere "bodily injury '' 8 versus "serious bodily injury."" "Serious
bodily injury differs from bodily injury in the substantiality of
pain, risk, disfigurement or impairment which is created."20
The language of these definitions is nearly identical to the
Model Penal Code source2' and to the New York Penal Law.22 By
inserting "[iut includes serious mental illness or impairment," the
1973 Legislature journeyed beyond these two sources and innova-
tively established an approach in which the victim's mental func-
tions were impaired as a result of a physical attack. 3 With the new
code, "serious bodily injury" received definition, clarity, and a
seemingly workable four-pronged classification scheme. This new
meaning, however, is less flexible than "grievous bodily harm" and
creates a higher standard of proof for prosecutors to hurdle.
III. DEFINING "SERIOUS BODILY INJURY"
Clear and concise meanings of serious bodily injuries as op-
posed to mere bodily injuries are important because one of the dis-
12. 105 Mont. 490, 73 P.2d 718 (1937).
13. See also Comment, Recent Developments- "Substantial Risk of Death" in the
Montana Aggravated Assault Statute, 38 MONT. L. REV. 414, 416-17 (1977).
14. Laughlin, 105 Mont. at 495, 73 P.2d at 720 (citing State v. Doherty, 52 Or. 591,
595-96, 98 P. 152, 154 (1908)).
15. Id. at 494, 73 P.2d at 720.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(5) (1985).
19. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(59) (1985).
20. Id., Commission Comments.
21. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), which reads: "Seri-
ous bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which
causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or organ."
22. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(10) (McKinney 1965).
23. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-202(1).
1987]
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tinguishing features between "aggravated assault," "felony as-
sault," and "assault" is the degree of bodily harm inflicted or
apprehended.24 The minimum standard necessary for conviction
under Montana's aggravated assault offense involves "purposely"
or "knowingly" causing a serious bodily injury to another with or
without the use of a weapon.2 5 A felony assault requires mere
"bodily injury to another with a weapon" or "reasonable apprehen-
sion of serious bodily injury. . . by use of a weapon. ' 26 Intentional
conduct resulting in bodily injury without the use of any weapon
constitutes simple assault which carries a lesser sentence than ei-
ther felony or aggravated assault.
27
"Serious bodily injury" also is considered for sentencing pur-
poses under Montana's aggravated kidnapping statute.28 A con-
victed kidnapper may receive a reduced sentence by voluntarily re-
leasing the victim alive and not suffering from serious bodily
29injury.
Imagine a hypothetical situation where one person kicks an-
other person in the stomach. The victim, feeling dazed, is taken to
a hospital where the doctor discovers a bleeding laceration of the
right lobe of the liver. The doctor performs surgery and the vic-
tim's condition returns to normal. The victim, after remaining in
the hospital under observation for a short period of time, is even-
tually released.30 Although the surgery results in a long scar run-
ning the length of the victim's upper body, the victim has the scar
removed with plastic surgery prior to trial. 1
There is no question in the minds of reasonable persons that
the victim suffered some degree of physical injury. The trier of fact
faces the formidable task of determining the seriousness of bodily
injury sustained.3 2 Section 45-2-101(5) of Montana Code Anno-
24. See generally MacKenzie, Criminal Assault in Montana: A New Face for an Old
Code, 35 MONT. L. REV. 184 (1974).
25. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-202(l) (1985).
26. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-202(2)(a), (b), (c) (1985).
27. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-201(1)(a) (1985).
28. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-303 (1985).
29. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-303(2) (1985) provides a ten-year maximum prison sen-
tence if the victim is free from serious bodily injury; otherwise, the offender's criminal act
invokes a life sentence or death penalty as a maximal standard.
30. The author adapted the facts of State v. Anderson, 370 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Minn.
App. 1985) for this example.
31. The victim's scar had not yet been removed by the time of trial in Anderson, al-
though the defendant unsuccessfully attempted to introduce evidence that the victim was
considering having plastic surgery after the trial. Id. at 706.
32. Even if the victim did not incur a serious bodily injury, the offender may still be
convicted of felony assault under MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-202(2)(a) if the offender inflicted
injury by use of a weapon. Under MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(71) (1985), "[w]eapon means
[Vol. 48
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tated ss is an apparent attempt to assist the jury in recognizing a
serious bodily injury. The criminal code may provide this defini-
tional tool, but the statute is silent with respect to the "proper"
injury to be considered. The absence of any express guidelines
leaves the factfinder guessing as to which of the following is the
"proper" injury for scrutiny: (1) the actual injury, if any, existing
at the time of trial, or (2) the potential injury which did not in fact
develop, but could have resulted absent medical intervention.
Thus, not knowing which of the two injuries to examine may con-
fuse the jury. The problems encountered in applying Montana's
current statutory definition of "serious bodily injury" are readily
apparent.
In the hypothetical example above, a jury may rationally con-
clude that there is no "substantial risk of death" since the doctor
intervened and prevented permanent serious bodily injury.3' A
liver laceration, however, can be a "life-threatening" injury if the
any instrument, article, or substance which, regardless of its primary function, is readily
capable of being used to produce death or serious bodily injury." While the use of hands and
feet ordinarily do not constitute the use of weapons per se, a Mississippi court in Pulliam v.
State, 298 So. 2d 711, 713 (Miss. 1974) held that "the use of feet and fists are deadly weap-
ons if used with the means or force likely to produce death." See also State v. Zangrilli, 440
A.2d 710, 711 (R.I. 1982) (hands were considered weapons); Annot. 33 A.L.R.3D 922 (1976).
But see State v. Dazhan, 15 Or. App. 300, -, 516 P.2d 92, 96 (1973) (no instruction was
requested or given that the jury could consider a shoe, used to inflict bodily injury upon the
victim, as a weapon); State v. Jones, 266 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 1978) (trial court was re-
quested, but did not give, an instruction that the use of defendant's fists, resulting in the
victim's injuries, were considered a weapon). Hence, an offender's bodily parts may not al-
ways be construed as weapons. Fear of setting unwieldy precedent may result in a court's
reluctance to do so. In fact, there have been no Montana cases to date deeming the use of
hands, feet, and/or shoes as the use of a weapon. In these kinds of cases in Montana the
inquiry should focus on the nature and extent of the injury following the physical attack.
33. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(59) (1985).
34. See, e.g., Alvis v. State, 434 So. 2d 859, 860 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (Defendant
beat the victim, a middle-aged man suffering from angina, hypertension, and lung problems,
about his head and chest. The victim's blood pressure peaked at a "dangerously high" level
of 230/100 and "there had been some leakage of blood from the lung caused by blunt
trauma." These conditions necessitated a three-day stay at the hospital. Although medical
evidence established that any emotional or physical trauma could have caused a serious
injury due to the victim's preexisting coronary condition, the court concluded this was not a
"substantial risk of death."); State v. Howard, 195 Mont. 400, 402, 403 637 P.2d 15, 16-17
(1981) (Defendant beat the victim, dragged her across a vacant lot and attempted to stran-
gle her with a pair of pantyhose. She sustained strangulation marks, a bluish tinge to her
face and many petechiae (tiny purple spots caused by hemorrhaging of capillaries). The jury
determined the injuries were not in and of themselves "serious bodily injury" although the
attending physician testified he was "surprised to see a person with this much injury still
alive," and that "[sjhe looted like she should have been ueau."); St v. Moyer, 37 Or. App.
477, 587 P.2d 1054 (1978) (trial court specifically found that a stab wound in the chest
necessitating surgery to determine whether a vital organ had been injured did not involve a
substantial risk of death).
5
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internal bleeding is not stopped. s5 The factfinder may reason that
the victim did not suffer a "protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ" because the doctor conse-
quently prevented the development of a potential "protracted
loss. ' ' e A narrow interpretation may lead the factfinder to deter-
mine that the victim did not incur a "permanent disfigurement"
because the scar was subsequently removed by cosmetic proce-
dures prior to trial.3 7 Finally, the victim's suffering from a mental
impairment as a result of the assault depends upon the individual
victim's characteristics and may be difficult to assess at the time of
trial.
A prosecutor may only be able to prove "bodily injury" if the
factfinder strictly interprets "serious bodily injury," resulting in
lighter sentences for offenders who impose egregious behavior upon
innocent persons. On the other hand, defense counsel should argue
that the current definition of "serious bodily injury" grants exces-
sive latitude to the jury. Without explicit standards governing the
application of medical evidence in establishing a serious bodily in-
jury, arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of this definition by
the trier of fact becomes a distinct possibility. The jurors' emo-
tional response to the nature of the physical attack may override
the legal definition of "serious bodily injury." Hence, similar con-
duct by defendants in two different cases resulting in relatively
identical injuries to the respective victims may be considered seri-
ous bodily injury by one trier of fact and not by another."
35. Anderson, 370 N.W.2d at 706.
36. E.g., People v. Rucker, 94 A.D.2d 948, 464 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1983) (appellate court
found that the medical evidence that the victim's lacerations, if untreated, could have re-
sulted in "serious and protracted disfigurement" is insufficient to support the jury's deter-
mination that the victim sustained "serious physical injury").
37. Anderson, 370 N.W.2d at 706 (victim considered having scars removed by plastic
surgery). Cf. Moyer, 37 Or. App. at -, 587 P.2d at 1056 (scar from a penetrating knife
wound in the chest and a scar from exploratory surgery performed to determine whether
damage had been done to victim's heart did not constitute a "serious ... disfigurement"
since both scars were located in an area normally covered by clothing); Jones, 266 N.W.2d
at 708 (evidence that a broken jaw, if left untreated, would have left the victim permanently
disfigured did not convince the jury of "great bodily harm").
38. E.g., State v. King, 604 P.2d 923 (Utah 1979) (where a 3 inch stab wound in the
upper left chest constituted a "serious bodily injury"); but cf Moyer, 37 Or. App. 477, 587
P.2d 1054 (stab wound on the left side of the chest left a scar one to one and a quarter
inches long and one-eighth of an inch wide did not constitute a "serious bodily injury"); e.g.,
People v. Caliendo, 84 Ill. App. 2d 987, 405 N.E.2d 1133 (1980) (defendant's kicking the
victim in the chest fracturing three ribs resulted in "serious bodily injury"); but cf. Alvis,
434 So. 2d 859 (although the victim had been beaten and kicked about the head and chest,
had difficulty breathing, a sore rib cage, high blood pressure, and some leakage of blood
from the lung caused by blunt trauma, this did not constitute a "serious bodily injury");
e.g., Thomas v. State, 418 So. 2d 964, 965 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (gunshot wounds, although
[Vol. 48
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The factfinder's reliance on medically uncertain proof of seri-
ous bodily injury can lead to strained interpretations of the statu-
tory definition. This dilemma-the absence of a standard provid-
ing a more clear and convincing level of proof that the victim
incurred a serious bodily injury or that the victim would have in-
curred such an injury but for medical intervention-was precisely
the issue in State v. Goodwin.39 A thorough examination of the im-
plications of the Goodwin case justifiably warrants the conclusion
that revision of the statutory definition of "serious bodily injury"
is in order.
IV. STATE v. GOODWIN
A. The Facts
The defendant, a middle-aged man, took the victim, a seven-
year-old girl, to a secluded spot in the country.40 He removed her
clothes and tied her to his truck seat with a white rope.41 He then
choked and assaulted her, physically and sexually, and threatened
to kill her if she told anyone of the incident.42 The defendant later
released the child approximately five blocks from her home leaving
her to walk the rest of the way.43
An immediate medical examination revealed "various bruises
and lacerations, including a severe laceration in the vaginal area
extending all the way to [her] cervix."4 4 Major surgery was neces-
sary to repair the vaginal laceration and to prevent the onset of
infection.45 The state charged Goodwin with aggravated kidnap-
ping and felony sexual assault.46
Montana's aggravated kidnapping statute provides in part
that a person convicted of the offense may be imprisoned up to 100
not "life-threatening," constituted "serious bodily injury" because a slight deflection in the
paths of the bullets could have caused paralysis or death by hitting a vital organ or blood
vessel); but cf. Stroup v. People, 656 P.2d 680, 686 (Colo. 1982) (stab wound between vic-
tim's eyes was not "serious bodily injury" even though medical evidence established that
there could have been a substantial risk of death due to penetration of the brain had the
point of entry been a fraction of an inch to the right or left); e.g., Cronin v. State, 454 A.2d
735 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982) (victim's two dislodged teeth constituted "serious bodily injury");
but cf. Marshall v. State, 646 P.2d 611, 612 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (two "busted" teeth did
not amount to "serious bodily injury").
39. __ Mont. - , 679 P.2d 231 (1984).
40. Id. at __, 679 P.2d at 232.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at , 679 P.2d at 233.
46. Id. at __, 679 P.2d at 231.
1987]
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years "unless he has voluntarily released the victim alive, in a safe
place not suffering from serious bodily injury.''47 Defense counsel
challenged the constitutionality of this statute on grounds that
these "provisions . . . fail[ed] to require establishment of facts by
the State by a sufficiently stringent standard."'48 Goodwin's counsel
jointly argued the evidence was insufficient to support the trial
court's findings that the girl suffered serious bodily injury.49 Good-
win appealed a sentence of 60 years for aggravated kidnapping and
15 years for sexual assault."
B. The Issue
The dispositive issue in Goodwin was whether the evidence
was adequate to warrant the trial court's finding that the seven-
year-old suffered serious bodily injury. Goodwin contended that
the evidence fulfilled none of the four statutory categories. 51 The
defendant argued that the successful medical treatment obviated
any serious or permanent risks.52 He further emphasized the lack
of certainty in the medical testimony and contended that any con-
ditions threatening to her were only possibilities which did not oc-
cur.53 Justice Weber, writing for a unanimous court, disagreed.
C. The Analysis
1. "Substantial Risk of Death"
Goodwin asserted there was no substantial risk of death be-
cause the infection feared by medical personnel never occurred."
In rejecting this argument, the supreme court relied on medical
testimony presented at trial. Since the laceration suffered by the
child was very near the perineal membrane, the abdominal cavity
could have been exposed to bacteria normally present in the vagi-
nal and rectal areas. The court upheld the inference that there
would have been a "substantial risk of death" due to infection had
the child not received appropriate medical treatment.55
47. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-303(3) (1985) (emphasis added).
48. Goodwin, - Mont. at -, 679 P.2d at 233.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at -, 679 P.2d at 234.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at -, 679 P.2d at 233-34.
[Vol. 48
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2. "Serious Permanent Disfigurement"
As an additional basis for finding serious bodily injury, the
Montana Supreme Court concluded that the victim suffered a seri-
ous permanent disfigurement. 6 Relying on the trial court's record,
the Goodwin court seemed convinced the evidence sufficiently sup-
ported a factual finding on this ground.57 "The term 'disfigure-
ment' connotes, among other things, deformity, defacement, mar-
ring and/or damage to one's attractiveness."" The court declared
that the child had been left with a serious permanent disfigure-
ment "within the commonly accepted meaning of that word" for
two implicit reasons: (1) the injury resulted in a scar in the vaginal
and perineal areas, and (2) a portion of the victim's hymen
ruptured.5
Whether an injury creates a serious permanent disfigurement
is ultimately for the jury to decide. The code does not provide a
definition for this term. 0 The potential for arbitrary and discrimi-
natory application of the statutory definition of "serious bodily in-
jury" is readily apparent. "Serious permanent disfigurement" in
one jury's opinion may not constitute "serious permanent disfig-
urement" to another jury."
3. "Protracted Loss of Impairment of the Function of Process .of
any Bodily Member or Organ"
The defendant asserted that the seven-year-old did not incur a
protracted loss of function of her bodily organs since a later exami-
nation of the victim revealed no problems with either functioning
of the urinary tract or rectum.2 Although both medical witnesses
testified that the injury could produce complications with sexual
intercourse and/or childbirth in the future, 3 neither could state
56. Id. at -, 679 P.2d at 235.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101 (1985).
61. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 138 Ariz. 211, 673 P.2d 955 (1983) (both defendants
raped a 21-year-old female victim; although her hymenal membrane was broken, the Ari-
zona Supreme Court held that such injury did not fit within the meaning of "disfigure-
ment," reasoning that the scar was in such a place so as not to distract from the victim's
physical attractiveness. Id. at __, 673 P.2d at 958); see also Thomas, 418 So. 2d at 965
(jury concluded that scars from a gunshot wound on the victim's back constituted "serious
and protracted disfigurement"): but see Davis v. State, 467 So. 2d 265, 267 (Ala. Crim. App.
1985) (scars resulting from gunshot wounds on the victim's hand and arm did not constitute
"serious . . . disfigurement").
62. Brief of Defendant, at 16.
63. Id. at 17-18.
19871
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with medical certainty whether the victim's bodily functions would
in fact be impaired.6 4 The defendant consequently alleged that this
lack of medical certainty outweighed any contrary proof. Justice
Weber did not emphasize this category in establishing serious bod-
ily injury. Instead he merely noted that any medical evaluation
with respect to the child's sexual or childbearing functions was
premature.5
4. "Mental Illness or Impairment"
One of the medical experts testified that "there is usually an
emotional scar in such cases of child sexual abuse, although in this
case it was too early to tell." 66 The Goodwin court did not rely on
this fourth criterion apparently because of the conjectural nature
of this testimony. There have been no cases in Montana defining
this category, perhaps because of the difficulty encountered at trial
of assessing whether a victim will suffer from a mental illness in
the future. Nevertheless, applying the same line of analysis the
court used in identifying "substantial risk of death"-that the in-
jury would have been a serious injury had it gone un-
treated 67-could result in the finding of mental impairment as
well.
D. The Goodwin Dilemma
The court expressed dissatisfaction with the current status of
Montana's "injury" statutes" stating "The[se] statutes leave for
the courts the difficult line-drawing involved in distinguishing the
two categories of injury. ' 69 On one hand, a sound argument could
be made in defendant Goodwin's favor. Under the applicable lan-
guage of subsection (59),70 a person cannot be held to have com-
mitted aggravated assault (or aggravated kidnapping, as in this
case) unless he "purposely" or "knowingly" causes serious bodily
injury to another. The Goodwin court focused largely on "substan-
tial risk of death" in describing the seriousness of the victim's inju-
ries. From a narrow standpoint, the defendant Goodwin did not
64. Id. at 18.
65. Goodwin, - Mont. at -, 679 P.2d at 234. In examining the medical testi-
mony with respect to all of the girl's injuries, Justice Weber declared "[i]t was ... too early
to know whether normal sexual intercourse or childbearing would be possible."
66. Id.
67. Id. at -, 679 P.2d at 233.
68. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101(5) (bodily injury) and § 45-2-101(59) (serious bodily
injury) (1985).
69. Goodwin, - Mont. at -, 679 P.2d at 233.
70. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(59) (1985).
[Vol. 48
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inflict a serious injury. Testimony from the attending surgeon es-
tablished that the victim in fact had never been placed in substan-
tial risk of death by her injuries, although the injuries were con-
ceivably fatal.71 The evidence revealed that any substantial risks
would have been imminent only if the child had not received medi-
cal attention. 2
.Goodwin's argument is "indistinguishable" from the argument
rejected in State v. Fuger.7 - In Fuger, the defendant kicked and
beat the victim about the face and upper portion of the body.74
When admitted to the hospital, the victim "was in a semi-con-
scious state with extensive bruises and swelling around the face
[and suffering from] a broken nose and a fractured palate.17
Relying on medical evidence that "[n]o serious complications
in fact developed as a result of [the victim's] injuries, "76 the de-
fendant contended that "in retrospect [the victim] was not in 'sub-
stantial risk of death' at any time. '77 The Fuger court struck down
this argument: "[T]he test of 'substantial risk of death' is not
whether the victim lives or dies."'78 The Fuger court ruled that the
evidence sufficiently enabled the jury to find that the victim's inju-
ries created a "substantial risk of death." Therefore, the Fuger
rule, likewise employed in Goodwin, is not a hindsight test. Rather,
the combination of Fuger and Goodwin suggests that the factfinder
may focus on the extent of the injury inflicted prior to the victim's
receiving any medical treatment. This pattern indicates the Mon-
tana Supreme Court's unwillingness to limit inquiry to injuries
that are visible at trial.
The original draftsmen of the Model Penal Code definition of
"serious bodily injury" did not foresee the Goodwin dilemma. In
fact, the states that have adopted some variation of this definition
differ with respect to its proper application. For instance, some
courts have interpreted the definition as being directed exclusively
towards a present serious bodily injury.7 9 Conversely, other courts
have interpreted the definition to include serious injuries prior to
71. Goodwin, - Mont. at -, 679 P.2d at 132-34.
72. Id.
73. Id. at -, 679 P.2d at 234 (citing Fuger, 170 Mont. 442, 554 P.2d 1338).
74. 170 Mont. at 443, 444, 544 P.2d at 1340, 1341.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting People v. Martinez, 189 Colo. 408, 410, 540 P.2d 1091, 1093 (1975)).
79. E.g., People v. Rucker, 94 A.D.2d 948, 464 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1983) ("the statute re-
quires not that such [injury] could result, but that it actually did result"); State v. Jones,
266 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Minn. 1978); State v. Dazhan, 15 Or. App. 300, 516 P.2d 92 (1973);
Stroup v. People, 656 P.2d 680 (Colo. 1982).
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medical treatment.80
Although reasonable persons could only consider the victim's
injuries in Goodwin as serious, the court could not look to the
strict letter of the law for an answer. For this reason, the character
of the Goodwin court's interpretation appears slightly strained,
though the reasoning employed and the result reached were justifi-
able. The Montana Supreme Court judicially "amended" the defi-
nition of "serious bodily injury" to uphold the aggravated kidnap-
ping conviction where justice demanded a stricter sentence. It is
the legislature's function, however, to provide additional guidance
distinguishing a serious bodily injury from mere bodily injury to
maintain consistency for conviction purposes in our criminal jus-
tice system.
V. A SOLUTION
A. From the Prosecutor's Point of View
Montana's current definition does not instruct the factfinder
to examine potential consequences absent any medical interven-
tion. Thus, the trier of fact may believe that the existing statutory
definition focuses only on those injuries, if any, existing at trial
rather than on the possibility of a serious impairment. Lacking an
instruction to the contrary, the factfinder might not consider the
nature of a victim's injuries prior to medical treatment. If this is
the case, dangerous offenders who have severely injured victims
will receive a windfall in the form of a substantially lesser sen-
tence. An injury should not cease to become "serious" simply be-
cause the victim sought medical treatment which prevented a seri-
ous bodily injury from developing. The prosecutor could argue the
need for a definitional mechanism instructing the jury to consider
pre-treated injuries.
B. From the Defense Counsel's Point of View
Alternatively, as demonstrated in Goodwin, a jury might con-
sider hypothetical injuries which in fact could have, but did not,
develop. The prosecutor, however, must offer medical testimony
attempting to convince the jury of potential consequences of the
injury. Evidence, which might not otherwise convince a panel of
medical experts, may persuade the jury that a serious bodily injury
would have developed in the absence of medical treatment. De-
80. E.g., State v. Coburn, 315 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982); Anderson, 308 N.W.2d 42;
King, 604 P.2d 923; Martinez, 189 Colo. 408, 540 P.2d 1091.
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fense counsel could argue the need for a minimal evidentiary stan-
dard precluding prosecutorial abuse of conjectural medical testi-
mony. It would be unfair to allow jurors to find a potential serious
bodily injury based on evidence not medically probable.
C. A Proposal for a Legislative Amendment
By adding a provision of existing statutory law addressing
those circumstances where the victim sought medical aid, the
Goodwin dilemma can be eliminated. For example, the following is
a suitable codification of Goodwin: "(2) If it is medically probable
that a 'serious bodily injury' would have resulted in the absence of
any medical or surgical intervention or treatment, then for pur-
poses of this statute the injury shall be deemed a 'serious bodily
injury.'"
Hence a twofold test would emerge: the first test would simply
rest on the existing statutory language. The standard would re-
main consistent with the original legislative intent: an offender
could be convicted if it were evident at trial that the victim suf-
fered a serious bodily injury. The second test, however, would
come into effect only if a victim procured medical treatment.
Under the proposed amendment an injury would be considered a
serious bodily injury, if it was medically probable that the victim
would have incurred a serious injury without medical or surgical
intervention.
The Montana Legislature's innovation has achieved needed
change in the criminal law in the past. The Model Penal Code,
from which the "serious bodily injury" definition was derived, is
approximately twenty-five years old. It is time the legislature ana-
lyze the unforeseen implications inherent in an adopted uniform
statutory definition. Montana will have one of the most modern,
straightforward, and systematic applications of the definition of
"serious bodily injury" if our lawmakers establish a clearer ap-
proach and adopt this proposed amendment.
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